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Third party intervention is a typical response to destructive and 
persistent social conflict and comes in a number of different forms 
attended by a variety of issues. Mediation is a common form of 
intervention designed to facilitate a negotiated settlement on substantive 
issues between conflicting parties. Mediators are usually external to the 
parties and carry an identity, motives and competencies required to play 
a useful role in addressing the dispute. While impartiality is generally 
seen as an important prerequisite for effective intervention, biased 
mediators also appear to have a role to play.  
 
This article lays out the different forms of third-party 
intervention in a taxonomy of six methods, and proposes a contingency 
model which matches each type of intervention to the appropriate stage 
of conflict escalation. Interventions are then sequenced, in order to assist 
the parties in de-escalating and resolving the conflict. It must be pointed 
out, however, that the mixing of interventions with different power bases 
raises a number of ethical and moral questions about the use of reward 
and coercive power by third parties. The article then discusses several 
issues around the practice of intervention. It is essential to give these 
issues careful consideration if third-party methods are to play their 
proper and useful role in the wider process of conflict transformation. 
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Third-party intervention in situations of human conflict has a 
long history and a wide variety of forms and functions. Disputants in 
most, if not all, societies and at all levels of social interaction have had 
access to external actors to whom they can turn when they find they are 
unable to manage their differences by themselves. A common response 
to perceived incompatibilities in goals, methods or values between 
contesting parties is to enter into a process of negotiation in order to 
reach a mutually acceptable agreement on such differences. Negotiation 
thus appears to be a universal, human phenomenon, although it is of 
course expressed in variations that are appropriate to each cultural 
context.  
 
Mediation, which is intended to facilitate the negotiation 
process, also needs to be practiced within the norms and assumptions of 
any given cultural milieu, whether that be the culture of a given society or 
identity group, an organization or set of institutions, or international 
diplomacy. At the same time, Western theorists and practitioners of 
negotiation and mediation have attempted to spell out generic models of 
these processes, which they hope will serve to capture many of the 
essential elements. Much further cross-cultural research will be 
necessary to tell us if this is indeed the case. 
 
In these models, the various forms of observed third-party 
intervention are distinguished primarily by the degree of power that the 
intervener exercises over the process and outcome of the conflict. At the 
high end of such a power spectrum, disputes may be made subject to 
legal rulings through adjudication or binding decisions by means of 
arbitration. In the middle range of influence, powerful mediators may 
make use of a whole range of inducements or threatened punishments in 
order to move the disputants toward settlement. At the low end of the 
power continuum, third parties may play a facilitative and diagnostic role, 
helping conflicting parties to understand their problem more clearly and 
assisting them in their efforts to construct agreements or restructure their 
relationship. At a minimum, intervenors will typically work to improve 
communication between the parties, so that they can more effectively 
manage their differences. Sometimes the work of the third-party can be 
as simple as providing a neutral venue and a façade for face-saving, so 
that the disputants can meet to address their conflict. 
 
This continuum of power along which third-party interventions 
vary is characterized not only by a descending capacity to influence, but 
also by a noteworthy shift in the type of power exercised. Thus more 
traditional, coercive methods engage influence and control as “power 
over”, while problem-solving methods seek to engage and induce “power 
with”, to draw on a useful distinction from the feminist literature (Schaef, 
1981; Taylor & Miller, 1994). In a similar vein, Weeks (1992) speaks of 
“negative power” as the effort to gain advantage over the other party, 
I n t r o d u c t i o n  
  
F i s h e r  
versus “positive power” that works to promote the constructive 
capabilities of both parties. Clearly, the more recent and more innovative 
forms of third-party intervention will operate through “power with”, and 
seek to influence antagonists toward the use of “positive” rather than 
“negative” power. In order to do this, the third-party will seek to maintain 
control over the process of the intervention, rather than over the 
outcomes. 
 
The defining characteristics of the third-party are of course 
central to the exercise of influence and intertwine with the functions in 
the determination of outcomes. The identity of the intermediary must 
therefore be duly considered, especially in terms of his or her relationship 
with the conflicting parties, as this is will have a bearing on status and 
impartiality. It is essential to know if the third-party is to serve in an 
official or formal role, with all the requirements and limitations that this 
entails, or whether he or she is instead operating in an unofficial or 
informal capacity, with greater freedom of movement but also with higher 
ambiguity. Identity is also closely linked to the motives and interests 
which lead an outsider to become involved in the domain of the conflict, 
as well as to the qualities and competencies that the third-party brings to 
the process. While most theorizing about these different aspects of the 
nature of the third-party has taken place mainly around the method of 
mediation, similar questions need to be asked of all forms of intervention. 
 
A more recent notion in the current third-party literature is the 
idea that not all conflicts at all points in time will be amenable to a single 
and unified method of intervention. In other words, it is important to 
carefully consider all key elements of the conflict in question before 
surmising which form of intervention is likely to be most useful in moving 
the parties toward settlement and resolution.  
 
The defining characteristics of the context of the conflict need to 
be considered in the light of the question as to which type of third-party 
might intervene in the conflict most effectively and in which manner. 
Attention also needs to be paid to the stage of the conflict, which can 
range from initial expression and management through escalation to 
stalemate and exhaustion, and hopefully to negotiation, settlement, and 
post settlement. The role of violence in rendering conflicts protracted and 
seemingly intractable raises particularly difficult problems for 
interveners. This type of thinking, seeks to adapt method to certain 
aspects of reality, appears contrary to much traditional practice, 
especially in the area of mediation, which persists in applying the same 
medicine to what may be widely disparate problems. 
 
Likewise, the interplay between forms of third-party 
intervention and conflict transformation must be considered carefully, 
particularly because the various forms will typically play different roles in 
the overall process. Traditional mediation, especially as practiced from a 
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coercive power base, seeks above all to halt violence and gain a quick 
settlement which is often in the interests of the status quo. Consequently, 
processes of social change toward greater equity and equilibrium are 
suppressed. More innovative and less official forms of intervention, such 
as problem-solving workshops, which focus instead on the analysis of 
underlying causes of the conflict in order to address the legitimate 
underlying interest of all parties, are more clearly directed toward longer-
term conflict transformation.  
 
In this work, power asymmetries must be considered and the 
relationship of destruction transformed into one that manages conflict 
constructively. Conflict transformation further requires that the 
antagonists agree upon and create the political, economic and social 
structures that will engender positive peace with social justice over the 
longer term. It is clear that these kinds of outcomes require more complex 
and coordinated third-party activities than the field of conflict resolution 
has been able to develop and implement so far. 
 
There is, in summary, a fair degree of both confusion and 
dissension as well as clarity and agreement in the domain of third-party 
intervention. There are many issues and questions that need to be 
addressed through theory, research, and practice. I have alluded to the 
question of cultural “generalizability” and appropriateness, as well as to 
the issues of third-party bias and motivation. When we then consider the 
further questions of the timing of intervention and the reality of power 
asymmetries between the parties, we begin to appreciate the enormous 
complexity of the challenges for both understanding and practice.  
 
In addition, basic questions must be asked about the overall 
effectiveness of third-party activities, as well as about the ethics of 
intervention, often in systems which are foreign to one’s own. It is not 
surprising that the domain of third-party intervention is currently one of 
the most active for social science theoreticians and practitioners. 
 
This article will focus first on the method of mediation, 
acknowledging its role as one of the most commonly applied and studied 
forms of intervention in conflicts. This will set the larger stage for a 
consideration of the various forms and functions of third-party 
intervention, some of which draw their appeal from their supplementary 
nature to mediation and negotiation. A rudimentary model for matching 
types of interventions to the stage of conflict escalation will be presented 
as an initial heuristic for realizing the potential complementarity of 
different forms of intervention. Finally, a number of issues will be 
identified that can affect the overall current and future usefulness of 
third-party intervention in addressing the multitude of destructive 
conflicts that regularly beset humankind. 
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II.1 Definition and Expression 
 
There are a myriad of definitions of mediation now available in 
the literature, but these all rely on a core of common characteristics. 
Briefly put: mediation is generally seen as the intervention of a skilled 
and impartial intermediary working to facilitate a mutually acceptable 
negotiated settlement on the issues that are the substance of the dispute 
between the parties. As such, mediation is essentially a pacific, non-
coercive and non-binding approach to conflict management that is 
entered into freely by the concerned parties, who at the same time 
maintain control over the substance of the agreement. Thus, mediation is 
primarily a task-oriented method directed toward solving a shared 
problem of the parties; it is, in general, not directly concerned with the 
nature of the social relationship between the parties. Mediation can be 
directed toward disputes between two parties in its bilateral form, but 
can also involve multiple parties when it is called upon to assist in 
multilateral negotiations. The greater complexity and challenge of such 
multilateral interventions have only recently become the subject of 
theoretical and empirical attention in the mediation field. 
 
As social conflict is an omnipresent facet of the human 
experience, it is hardly surprising that mediation finds expression at all 
levels of social functioning and in apparently all societies, past and 
present. According to a comprehensive yet concise treatment of the 
history of mediation by Christopher Moore (1996), this form of third-party 
intervention has been employed in almost all cultures in all regions of the 
world and in all phases of recorded history. Religious leaders, community 
elders, and, at times, special intermediaries have all played the role of 
mediator in their various efforts to deal with potentially destructive 
disputes in their respective collectivities. The current practice of 
mediation in secular, Western societies has seen the role proliferate to 
address all manner of disputes at the interpersonal level, from divorce 
and custody issues between separating spouses, to workplace grievances 
and complaints, to fights on school playgrounds, to landlord-tenant 
problems, to consumer complaints, and to corporate battles between 
executives.  
 
At the intergroup level, union-management mediation looks 
back on a long institutional history, while third-party intervention at the 
community level in racial and neighborhood disputes is, on the other 
hand, a more recent phenomenon. Intervention into multi-party 
environmental, regulatory and public policy disputes is also a growing 
area of practice and theory. Alternative Dispute Resolution works 
alongside the courts to apply mediation to criminal and legal issues 
through programs such as victim-offender reconciliation. The thrust of all 
of these initiatives is to replace or augment traditional and usually 
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authoritarian or adversarial methods of conflict management with 
approaches that instead require some form of joint problem-solving on 
the part of the antagonists.  
 
The rapid proliferation of mediation methods at the domestic 
level in the United States and some other countries since the 1960s has 
produced a growing body of literature that seeks to understand the 
process and its various applications. As Baruch Bush and Joseph Folger 
(1994) point out in their work on the transformative potential of the 
discipline, mediation continues to be generally understood as “an 
informal process in which a neutral third-party with no power to impose a 
resolution helps the disputing parties try to reach a mutually acceptable 
settlement (p. 2).” Their analysis identifies four competing “stories” or 
accounts of mediation, each emphasizing different dimensions of the 
process and its outcomes.  
 
The “satisfaction story” argues that mediation facilitates 
collaborative problem-solving, as opposed to distributive bargaining, and 
thereby produces integrative solutions that can satisfy all parties. The 
“social justice” story proposes that mediation helps to organize people 
with common interests into stronger communities that are less 
dependent on outside actors to solve their problems and thus less 
vulnerable to exploitation. The “oppression story” presents a radically 
different picture, contending that mediation has become an instrument 
for the powerful to take advantage of the weak in society. Finally, the 
“transformation story” proposes that the power of mediation is to be 
found in its ability to transform not only the moral character and capacity 
of the disputants but also of the wider society in which they live.  
 
While none of these four stories can be regarded as definitively 
true, Bush and Folger contend that the satisfaction story is the most 
accurate: the dominant form of practice in mediation does indeed revolve 
around the solving of problems and the gaining of settlements, as 
opposed to oppression, empowerment or transformation of individuals. 
At the same time, Bush and Folger would like to place a greater emphasis 
on transformative mediation, pointing to its significant potential for 
engendering the personal development of disputants toward both greater 
strength and greater compassion. Consequently, mediation offers the 
capacity for both empowerment (the restoration of an individual’s own 
sense of value and capacity) and recognition (the individual’s 
acknowledgement and empathy for the other party’s problems). 
Individual changes of this nature are seen as an expression of a new 
moral and social vision, in which society comes to value relations 
between people rather than individual satisfaction. The social justice 
story thus offers striking parallels to the conflict transformation as 
described above. 
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Mediation in international relations also has a long history and, 
parallel to the development of the nation-state system, has become 
increasingly employed. Diplomatic practitioners have come to consider 
mediation as part of their stock-in-trade, and some of the early works on 
the practice are powerful testimonials to their personal experience and 
wisdom. In this sphere, international mediation is often performed by a 
formal representative of a state, regional organization, or the United 
Nations, with the latter two coming to predominate in the second half of 
the twentieth century. At the same time, informal interventions by 
esteemed persons and religious intermediaries have come to be of 
increasing importance in international mediation. The current work of 
former U.S. President Jimmy Carter, and the quiet unofficial diplomacy of 
the Quakers serve as illustrations. 
 
The practice of international mediation in the political sphere is 
increasingly complemented by the intermediary activities of numerous 
actors at the mid- and grassroots levels in societies experiencing violent 
conflict. While their efforts have not been well documented, it is clear that 
mid-level officials, personnel of non-governmental organizations, and 
military officers on peacekeeping missions, among others, take part in a 
wide variety of intermediary activities. As they work in war zones or in 
areas undergoing reconstruction or other forms of societal 
transformation, these individuals make use of their organizational roles in 
order to bring about cooperation and problem-solving between 
representatives of antagonistic factions who continue to regard one 
another as the enemy.  
 
In addition to negotiating the many arrangements necessary to 
achieve mission or organizational objectives, these practitioners often 
find that they must mediate among various parties in order to meet their 
mandate, whether that be the maintaining of a ceasefire, the provision of 
humanitarian assistance to displaced persons, or the dispensing of health 
care to vulnerable populations. Current manifestations of ethnopolitical 
conflict and the international community’s response to these have thus 
raised further challenges for the theory and practice of mediation as a 
form of third-party intervention. 
 
 
II.2 Identity and Motives 
 
Third parties need to think carefully about who they are and 
precisely which attributes and interests they bring to the triadic 
bargaining situation. Mediators are distinguished by not having the same 
identity as either of the parties, nor has any direct interest in the dispute; 
were this so, the mediator would be party to it. This is not to say that 
mediators are disinterested, or that they have no tangible interests to be 
served by entering the domain of the conflict. States, for example, often 
enter into mediation of third-party conflicts in order to advance their own 
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security or economic interests, to maintain or increase their sphere of 
influence or to help keep an alliance together. As Christopher Mitchell 
(1988) points out, the motives for mediation are quite diverse and thus 
cannot be taken for granted. Motivations operate at both the individual 
(e.g., altruism, ego-enhancement, material gain) and the institutional 
level (e.g., the role of the UN, the prestige of a state). In all cases, the 
mediator receives some benefit from his or her assumption of the role, 
either through the process (e.g., improved status) or in the outcomes 
(e.g., advancement of security interests). 
 
Consideration of the full range of social situations that lend 
themselves to mediation will readily show that the identity of the 
mediator can vary considerably in relation to the both the parties and the 
context. Christopher Moore (1996) provides a useful taxonomy of this 
variety by identifying three types of mediators. Social network mediators 
are linked to the disputants by means of a continuous web of 
connections, which usually means that they will have some form of 
obligation to foster and maintain harmonious relationships. Examples of 
this include community elders, religious figures, business colleagues, and 
personal friends. The authoritative mediator has a formal relationship 
with the parties and also some degree of power over them, but does not 
make use of this to determine the outcome. Examples here include 
corporate managers, organizational supervisors, agency officials, and 
representatives of powerful states in the international community. 
Independent mediators can be found within those traditions of 
professional service that are designed to provide objective consultation 
to disputing parties, such as labor-management mediators, family 
mediators, and third parties in complex environmental disputes. While all 
of these mediators require some of the same core attributes and 
competencies, they also need expertise in their particular domain of 
operation. 
 
With regard to the specific motives of the parties entering 
mediation, the common hope is that they do so simply because they wish 
to resolve the conflict and have become frustrated if not stalemated in 
their own unilateral and bilateral attempts. Unfortunately, observers 
cannot always assume such constructive motives, as parties commonly 
enter into mediation for a number of other reasons. Frequently, it may 
prove difficult to refuse the invitation of a powerful mediator; such a 
rejection could reflect badly on credibility or image. Parties may then 
enter into mediation in order to stall for time while they develop new 
capacities to pursue alternative strategies, or they may simply try to 
(mis)use mediation as a means to advance their own unilateral interests, 
with no intention of compromise or joint problem-solving. Thus, one of 
the first and continuing tasks of a mediator is to accurately assess the 
motives of the parties as well as the authenticity of their desire to reach a 
mutually acceptable settlement. 
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II.3 Qualities and Competencies 
 
One essential quality closely linked to identity is that of 
mediator impartiality; this attribute finds its expression in the attitudes 
and behaviors exhibited by the mediator toward the parties in the 
mediation process. The issue of impartial versus biased third parties is 
discussed in greater detail below. Suffice it to say here that some amount 
of impartiality is almost always expected of any mediator: in the sense 
that he or she may not favor one party over the other and must be neutral 
about the outcomes that they may jointly create. The identity of the 
mediator should serve to engender trust on the part of the parties; 
indeed, in many cases, the mediating third-party is often the only initial 
repository of trust between antagonists who harbor only suspicion for 
one another.  
 
Beyond such fundamental attributes, third parties require the 
requisite knowledge and skill to properly fulfill their role. In the case of 
mediation, this means a thorough understanding of the parties, the 
substantive issues that divide them, the negotiation process itself, and 
the wider system in which it is embedded. Consequently, the competency 
for mediation depends first of all on a demonstrated capacity to facilitate 
the negotiation process. The list of specific behavioral skills or tactics that 
this requires is extensive and usually not a matter of consensual 
agreement. Suggestions range from empathetic listening to the 
manipulation of information, the ability to quickly draft text, and, last but 
not least, a sense of humor.  
 
 An attempt has been made by Christopher Honeyman (1993) 
and his colleagues at the domestic level in the United States to gain a 
synthesized set of mediator competencies applicable to the areas of 
labor-management, community, commercial, and family mediation. This 
ambitious project identifies the primary tasks of the mediator (e.g., to 
enable communication, to analyze information, to facilitate agreement), 
each with its own set of subtasks, as well as the skills required to perform 
these tasks (e.g., reasoning, nonverbal communication, recognizing 
values). The model then develops performance evaluation criteria with 
rating scales to judge mediator competency (e.g., empathy, skill in 
generating options, success in managing the interaction). Overall, it can 
be said that Western approaches to mediation tend to emphasize 
communication skills and the demonstrated capacity to facilitate joint 
problem-solving between the parties.  
 
Another popular typology of mediator functions or roles, 
proposed by Saadia Touval and William Zartman (1985), divides mediator 
behavior into the categories of communication (i.e. transmitting 
concessions), formulation (i.e., redefining issues), and manipulation (i.e. 
legitimizing a party’s demands). While communication and formulation 
are consistent with a traditional, impartial and basically altruistic 
  
P a g e  9  
approach to mediation, evidence of manipulation can raise questions 
about mediator bias and power, issues which are further discussed 
below. By and large, the mediator will require all the requisite skills to 
help move the parties through the negotiation process, from initial 
contact and pre-negotiation to defining issues and identifying interests to 
generating alternatives to exchanging preferences and concessions to 
integrating alternatives to persuading parties toward an agreement, and 
finally to working out the details of implementation. 
 
 
II.4 Assessing Effectiveness 
 
At the international level, mediation has for centuries been an 
integral part of the standard practice of diplomacy, although its 
effectiveness has only recently become the object of scientific study. In 
the domestic arena, traditional forms of mediation have existed for a long 
time, but most research attention has been directed to newer forms of 
mediation that have developed alongside existing legal practices for 
settling disputes. There has been a concerted effort to assess these 
alternate forms of dispute resolution, and especially their claim to have 
certain superior qualities as compared to established court procedures. 
 
A wide variety of indicators have been employed in order to 
evaluate the effectiveness of mediation in a range of situations, from 
victim offender reconciliation, to divorce mediation, to small claims court, 
to neighborhood disputes, to landlord-tenant conflict, and to 
environmental and public policy controversies. Kenneth Kressel and Dean 
Pruitt (1989) provide a comprehensive list of the types of indicators that 
have been used to evaluate the success of mediation. In terms of 
outcomes, rates of settlement are an obvious indicator, while rates of 
compliance with agreements and disputant satisfaction with the 
settlement are also important considerations. In addition, the nature of 
the agreement is always of interest, as mediation often claims to produce 
a greater degree of compromise and equal sharing of resources than 
adjudicated procedures.  
 
One might add that it is also important to look at the integrative 
nature of agreements, that is, the degree to which “win-win” rather than 
“win-lose” or “lose-lose” outcomes are produced. Kressel and Pruitt also 
note the importance not only of the effectiveness of mediation, but also 
of its efficiency. Indicators illustrating this criterion include the speed of 
the settlement process, the cost of the procedures employed, and the 
savings that accrue from the avoidance of expensive court fees as well as 
the costs of other legal services. Finally, they point to the postdispute 
climate and the longer-term relationship of the disputants as yet another 
place to look in assessing overall mediator effectiveness. A general 
comment on the effectiveness of mediation in the context of third-party 
intervention will be provided below. 
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III.1 A Taxonomy of Methods 
 
Mediation may be the most common form of third-party 
intervention, but it is in theory and practice usually augmented by a 
number of other methods. Numerous terms abound in the third-party 
literature: conciliation, fact-finding, good offices, peer mediation, 
arbitration, facilitation, adjudication, mediation-arbitration, policy 
dialogue, and consensus building. The fact that third parties operate at 
many levels and in many different sectors within and between societies 
simply adds to the complexity and the confusion. Some of these roles 
involve interveners in their official capacity, while others are performed in 
a more informal manner. Some interventions operate at the highest levels 
of decision-making (macro), while others depend on influence given at 
the middle (meso) ranges of society, while yet others typically work at the 
community or grassroots (micro) level. 
  
In the global domain, third-party activities can be included in a 
wider conception of multi-track diplomacy, as laid out by John McDonald 
and Louise Diamond. This work builds on Joseph Montville’s original 
distinction between Track I and Track II diplomacy, with the former 
defined as traditional diplomatic activities and the latter described as 
unofficial, unstructured interactions between adversarial groups or 
nations directed toward conflict resolution. Diamond and McDonald 
(1996) propose nine tracks of peacemaking and peacebuilding, starting 
with Tracks I and II as proposed by Montville. To these they add several 
further tracks that work within various sectors of global society to 
promote peace. Track IV, for example, describes the efforts of private 
citizens in unofficial capacities as they engage in mediation activities 
such as informal mediation, exchange programs, and work for non-
governmental organizations. Track VII outlines the role of religion in 
peacemaking on the part of religious communities and movements such 
as pacifism and non-violence. Most of these broad tracks will involve a 
variety of unofficial actors as they engage in intermediary activities of 
various kinds. 
 
 More modestly, Loraleigh Keashly and myself surveyed 
the third-party literature some years ago, and in that process developed 
an initial taxonomy of the primary methods of intervention (Fisher and 
Keashly 1990). Our goal was to bring some clarity to the confused state in 
which the same term had been used to mean very different things, while 
at the same time different terms were employed to describe what was 
basically the same activity. We also sought to react to the blurring of the 
lines in the literature between traditional mediation and the newer forms 
of third-party intervention, which focused more on the subjective 
elements of conflict (misperceptions, basic needs) and on the quality of 
the relationship between the antagonists. Our concern was that a lack of 
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distinction could easily result in a devaluing of the appropriateness and 
utility of methods such as dialogue facilitation and problem-solving 
workshops, which attempt to build understanding and trust, rather than 
the mere hammering out of agreements. This work produced a six-fold 
typology of pacific interventions, geared mainly to the international level, 
but appropriate at other levels as well: 
 
1. Conciliation, in which a trusted third-party provides an informal 
communicative link between the antagonists for the purposes 
of identifying the issues, lowering tension and encouraging 
direct interaction, usually in the form of negotiation. 
2. Consultation, in which the third-party works to facilitate creative 
problem-solving through communication and analysis, making 
use of human relations skills and social-scientific 
understanding of conflict etiology and dynamics.  
3. Pure Mediation, in which the third-party works to facilitate a 
negotiated settlement on substantive issues through the use of 
reasoning, persuasion, effective control of information, and the 
suggestion of alternatives. 
4. Power Mediation, which encompasses pure mediation but also 
moves beyond it to include the use of leverage or coercion on 
the part of the mediator in the form of promised rewards or 
threatened punishments, and may also involve the third-party 
as monitor and guarantor of the agreement. 
5. Arbitration, wherein the third-party renders a binding judgment 
arrived at through consideration of the individual merits of the 
opposing positions and then imposes a settlement which is 
deemed to be fair and just. 
6. Peacekeeping, in which the third-party provides military personnel in 
order to monitor a ceasefire or an agreement between 
antagonists, and may also engage in humanitarian activities 
designed to restore normalcy in concert with civilian personnel, 
who may also assist in the management of political decision-
making processes such as elections. 
 
In this taxonomy, consultation is roughly equivalent to Track II 
in Diamond and McDonald’s model, wherein a skilled professional 
operates in an unofficial capacity to analyze, prevent, and resolve 
conflicts. While their focus is primarily on the international level, I have 
noted that third-party consultation can also find definition and expression 
at the interpersonal and intergroup levels of interaction (Fisher 1972, 
1983). The utility of consultation, with its focus on the proper diagnosis of 
and improvement in relationships, lies in the very useful complementary 
role that it can play to mediation, especially in the pre-negotiation stage. 
Here misunderstandings are cleared up, emotional issues are separated 
  
F i s h e r  
from substantive ones, and a sense of working trust is built which the 
parties can then take into negotiations.  
 
At the domestic level, some forms of relationship-orientated 
mediation provide for this type of focus and interaction, especially as 
compared to a settlement-oriented approach. At the international level, 
as well as in some intergroup work, such as in the labor-management 
arena, mediation has all too often been characterized by a general 
neglect of emotional and attitudinal factors, viewing these only as 
difficulties to be worked around. It seems clear, then, that some 
combination of consultation and mediation may be the most effective way 
of implementing a more comprehensive process of conflict resolution. 
 
 
III.2 A Contingency Approach to Intervention 
 
The realization that third-party methods can be employed in a 
variety of combinations or sequences led Loraleigh Keashly and myself to 
think further about how they might best be matched to key aspects of the 
particular conflict situation. We started with the recognition that conflicts 
are inherently a mixture of objective interests (e.g., competition over 
scarce resources such as territory) and subjective elements (such as 
perceptions, attitudes, valuing of goals). We were aware that as conflicts 
escalate or become more intense, the subjective aspects usually come to 
play an increasing role; eventually, individuals or groups engaged in truly 
destructive conflict will genuinely come to see two different realities and 
hold extreme negative images of one another, while at the same time 
unquestionably maintaining a positive self-image.  
 
These factors typically make the management of tangible 
interests much more difficult for third parties such as mediators, and 
obstruct their attempts to move the parties toward settlement. To help, 
we developed a contingency model of third-party intervention, drawing 
on the earlier work of a few others in the field, particularly that of 
Friedrich Glasl (1982) and Hugo Prein (1984) at the organizational level. 
Our model proposes to match the lead or initial third-party intervention 
undertaken to the stage of conflict escalation, i.e. to the particular mix of 
objective and subjective factors. (Fisher and Keashly 1991; Keashly and 
Fisher 1996). We surmised that, properly structured, lead interventions 
would achieve initial effects, and could then be followed by further 
interventions designed to de-escalate the conflict to the point at which 
the parties could manage it themselves. 
 
We first developed a stage model of conflict escalation which 
captures many of the objective and subjective elements that prove to be 
important as the conflict intensifies, as the parties apply more powerful 
and contentious measures and as the difference between winning and 
losing becomes greater. Building on the work of other theoreticians, we 
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put forward a four-stage model of escalation: 1) discussion, 2) polarization, 
3) segregation, and 4) destruction.  
 
During the first stage of discussion, the parties usually maintain 
a respectful relationship with one another and are jointly concerned with 
achieving joint gain on objective interests. They are also hesitant to move 
into negotiations, however, so that the third-party intervention of 
conciliation is appropriate. This type of intervention can deal effectively 
with minor perceptual and emotional issues, and move the parties into 
negotiations to manage their differences.  
 
At stage two, polarization, when the relationship is beginning to 
deteriorate and negative perceptions (stereotypes) and emotions 
(hostility) emerge, consultation is seen as the lead intervention. If this 
kind of intervention manages to help clear up the misperceptions and 
misunderstandings, and to defuse the emerging emotional negativity, the 
parties can then be encouraged to enter into pure mediation in order to 
reach an agreement.  
  
At stage three, segregation, subjective elements predominate, 
with high levels of mistrust and disrespect, limited direct communication, 
the use of threats, and increased use of “good versus evil” images. At this 
stage, the model proposes that stronger medicine in the form of 
arbitration (if available) or power mediation may be required to control 
the hostility of the parties and reduce the negative effects that it is having 
on the relationship. It is clear, however, that the imposition of a 
temporary settlement or ceasefire at this stage of the proceeding does 
little more than provide the opportunity to then begin serious work on the 
relationship, using consultation. If improvements do indeed ensue, the 
parties may again be encouraged to employ pure mediation in order to 
broaden and finish the settlement process.  
 
Stage four, destruction, presents the greatest challenge for 
third-party interveners, since the parties in conflict basically see each 
other as “subhuman” and regard the situation in which they find 
themselves as hopeless, to the point that they are willing to settle for 
losing less than the other if they cannot win. At this stage, parties often 
see their very survival at stake, whether that means job loss, physical 
abuse to the point of murder, or even the attempted annihilation of an 
identity group as in genocide. Our model now prescribes some form of 
peacekeeping to separate the parties, and to provide an opportunity for 
other methods to work. Again, some form of arbitration or power 
mediation may be useful for the initial control of hostility and aggression. 
But this will not suffice: now a deeper form of consultation in the form of 
intense and prolonged conflict analysis may be necessary to induce the 
parties back down the escalation staircase, now littered with resentments 
over past actions. This is where consultation must encourage 
  
F i s h e r  
reconciliation, and help the parties to gain a shared picture of how they 
arrived at such a point of intractability. 
 
What the contingency model proposes are methods to increase 
the level and to expand the types of power available to the third-party 
interveners, in parallel to the parties’ actions to escalate influence. 
(Fisher and Keashly 1990). Stronger investments, commitments and 
tactics by the parties to the conflict may in turn require stronger and 
broader forms of influence by the third-party intervener, in order to 
induce the parties to fundamentally reconsider their approach to the 
conflict.  
 
Different forms of interventions find their legitimacy in different 
types of power, and need to be evaluated in terms of both their 
effectiveness and their ethical acceptability. Conciliation, consultation, 
and pure mediation tend to exert lower levels of control over both 
process and outcome, and also to rely more on referent (professional) 
and expert (knowledge) power that is shared (“power with”). Arbitration, 
power mediation and peacekeeping are characterized by a higher level of 
control over both process and outcome, and inject more legitimate (role), 
reward and coercive power into the situation (“power over”). Thus, the 
mixing and sequencing of these various methods raises a range of ethical 
and moral implications that call for careful and continuous review. 
 
The contingency model challenges third parties to always 
consider carefully the approach they are proposing to implement, and to 
carry out a detailed analysis of the conflict before assuming that their 
method is the most appropriate and useful at that point in time. The 
intention here is not to rule out simultaneous applications of different 
methods, which can play a useful ongoing role ,(for example, that of 
parallel consultation during mediation.) Rather, it is to encourage more 
traditional interveners to examine whether their methods are indeed 
adequate to meet the specific demands that subjectivity and complexity 
bring to escalated and destructive conflicts regardless of the level of 
interaction. A lead analysis using a consultative approach may often be 
the best way to start such a series of interventions, assuming that the 
parties are amenable to this form of interaction. Case experience 
indicates that parties are often willing to enter into informal, low risk 
discussions before they are prepared to negotiate. 
 
A further analysis provided by Louis Kriesberg (1996) goes 
beyond the contingency model to link mediator activities or functions at 
the international level to the appropriate stage of conflict expression: 
from preparing to de-escalate, to initiating negotiations, to conducting 
negotiations, and finally to implementing agreements. In addition to 
discussing such activities, Kriesberg identifies three forms of mediation, 
based on the identity of the intervener: formal mediators, informal third 
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parties, and quasi-mediators, who are members of one party but also 
carry out important mediating functions.  
 
The analysis then identifies potential opportunities for the three 
roles to make the same and different contributions to the conflict 
resolution process. Some activities, such as selecting the parties to be 
invited to negotiations, can only be carried out by a formal mediator. And 
some – for example, adding resources for settlement – can only be 
implemented by powerful formal mediators. Others, such as reframing 
the conflict, are best carried out by informal third parties in the earlier 
stages of the conflict through interventions along the lines of problem-
solving workshops. Finally, some activities prove to be most effective 
when implemented by quasi-mediators building trust and credibility 
during the negotiation process.  
 
Kriesberg thus brings more complex analysis to contingency 
thinking, and this may have applicability to levels of analysis other than 
the international. As further theorizing is supported by case studies and 
other forms of empirical evidence, a more comprehensive picture is likely 
to emerge, and we will be better equipped to fully answer the question as 
to how third-party interventions can appropriately be matched to key 
elements and stages of specific conflicts.  
 
Kriesberg’s analysis also is cognizant of the levels of society 
that interventions are directed toward, partly by maintaining the official 
and unofficial distinctions among the various methods. In a similar vein, 
John Paul Lederach (1997) has put forward a model encompassing the 
various actors, as well as the different approaches to peacebuilding, as 
they are linked to the different levels in the two contending societies.  
 
Official approaches typically take place at the top leadership 
level in the political, military and religious domains, with a high degree of 
visibility. These activities usually involve negotiations that are mediated 
by a highly visible mediator, typically an eminent figure backed by a 
government or international organization. Third party interventions at this 
level would typically be those of conciliation, pure and power mediation, 
arbitration, and peacekeeping, as identified in the contingency model. 
These approaches generally fall under the rubric of “Track I Diplomacy”, 
although more recent work involving official actors in innovative, 
“unofficial” processes, such as dialogue or roundtables, has led to the 
coining of the term “Track One and a Half”.  
  
At the mid-range leadership levels, individuals from a variety of 
sectors can serve as influentials and interveners in the conflict process. 
These can include academics and intellectuals, writers and journalists, 
ethnic and religious leaders, and leaders of non-governmental 
organizations. While these individuals and their associations do not hold 
formal power, they are nevertheless influential through the use of softer 
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forms of power, and are important links between the high-level 
leadership and the wider society. Approaches appropriate to this level 
include problem-solving workshops (interactive conflict resolution), 
training in conflict resolution, and bodies that deal with peace and 
reconciliation. In the language of the contingency model, much work can 
be done at this level using conciliation, pure mediation and third-party 
consultation in the form of dialogue and conflict analysis among mid-level 
leaders. 
 
At the grassroots level of society, local leaders work as 
community developers, local officials in the human services, refugee 
camp officials, and administrators of non-governmental organizations. 
These people represent and are in touch with the masses of society who 
are directly affected by the conflict dynamics. They usually operate on a 
day-to-day basis, and are primarily concerned with practical matters of 
survival and quality of life. Appropriate approaches at this level engage 
leaders and others in peacebuilding activities, the effects of which can 
filter up to higher levels as well. Local peace commissions, programs in 
prejudice reduction, training in conflict resolution and psychosocial work 
in trauma reduction are all useful activities in this sphere. 
 
In terms of the contingency model, grassroots forms of third-
party consultation can engage individuals from conflicting parties, while 
development aid and the related humanitarian work that fosters joint 
cooperative projects can help to build peace from the bottom-up. There is 
also much need for mediation, as peacekeepers, aid workers and others 
attempt to deal with the many local and regional disputes that arise and 
that must be resolved if the work of peacebuilding is to be successful. 
Thus, there are many possibilities in both theory and practice for linking 
third-party interventions to the hierarchical reality that is evident in most 
organized societies and reflected in the conflicts between them. 
 
Contingency thinking also challenges us to view third-party 
activities in the wider context of peace and conflict transformation. 
Conciliation, mediation (pure or power), and arbitration would usually be 
seen as within the domain of peacemaking. While they do vary in the 
degree of legitimacy and power which the third-party brings to the 
discussion, these methods all aim primarily to achieve a political 
settlement on the substantive issues of the dispute.  
 
Consultation, on the other hand, is best conceived within the 
domain of peacebuilding. The original conception of peacebuilding 
encompassed changing the political and economic systems of a society 
so as to reduce or eliminate the structural inequalities that are seen to 
cause open violence among different groups. More recently, a social 
dimension has been added to peacebuilding, in the sense that a variety of 
interactions among antagonists can be initiated to build or rebuild a 
cooperative relationship involving understanding, trust and cooperation. 
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Thus both the structural and the social streams of peacebuilding are 
important to create peaceful relations based on equity, respect and 
justice.  
 
Within the peacebuilding context, third-party consultation can 
be further expanded to become a broader method of interactive conflict 
resolution, involving all manner of facilitated face-to-face activities 
designed to promote collaborative conflict analysis and joint problem-
solving among antagonists in ways that address basic needs and build 
peace and justice (Fisher 1997). Such a broader form of intervention can 
take on a variety of forms: facilitation of dialogue between adversaries, 
joint training in conflict resolution skills, and conflict analysis workshops 
for influentials and other representatives of the parties are just a few 
examples.  
 
Interactive conflict resolution is best carried out by unofficial 
third parties who bring with them the requisite knowledge and skills to 
support consultation and other forms of intensive human interaction. 
Interactive conflict resolution can also be highly complementary and 
supportive of official activities in peacemaking, so that the peace process 
involves more than simply achieving a settlement. Thus, while they do not 
deal directly with the structural aspects of a conflict, these forms of 
intervention are highly supportive of movement toward conflict 
transformation, and clearly move the parties beyond mere conflict 
management. In particular, interactive methods lend themselves well 
toward reconciliation among adversaries, so that the gains of 
peacemaking are not lost through poor implementation or stolen by 
recurring waves of retribution. When the gains of peacebuilding are both 
structural and social, the future of harmonious and equitable relations 
are far more likely to ensue. 
 
 
 
 
 
Intervention in other people’s conflicts is fraught with a variety 
of political and pragmatic issues. What follows will illustrate six questions 
and problems that can arise in the context of conflict intervention by 
external actors. While most of these issues have so far been discussed 
largely in relation to mediation, they are certainly applicable to other 
forms of intervention as well. Of these, the first three issues are seen as 
more political in nature, as they relate to the relations between the 
parties and between them and the third-party, with a specific concern 
regarding the use and abuse of power. The last three issues are more 
pragmatic; these have to do with the strategies, outcomes and 
professional ethics of intervention.  
 
 
I V .  I s s u e s  i n  T h i r d - P a r t y  I n t e r v e n t i o n  
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IV.1 Culture 
 
In many cases of intervention, the third-party comes from a 
different (and often dominant) culture from that of the parties, who are 
often themselves from different cultures (often a mix of dominant and 
oppressed). Culture is a pervasive force in human affairs, with an often 
profoundly misunderstood or underestimated power to affect behavior. 
As each culture has its own assumptions, beliefs, norms, practices and 
institutions that seem appropriate to life in general, each also has a 
similar set of fundamentals that are seen as relevant to conflict. As Mark 
Ross (1993) and others have pointed out, the way in which conflict is 
defined, perceived, responded to, and managed is culturally embedded; 
that is, there is a “culture of conflict” in each society. Clearly, when 
cultural assumptions about conflict differ between antagonistic groups, 
these differences can become another source of conflict etiology or 
escalation. 
 
The question is therefore how third parties are to gain cross-
cultural sensitivity. How can they come to know their own culture, to 
understand and respect the cultures they enter, as well as to accurately 
perceive the effects of cultural differences between the parties, and 
between themselves and each party? The latter is particularly important 
when the third-party comes from a dominant culture and the parties from 
less dominant or even oppressed cultures. The current power imbalances 
in the world determine that many current interveners will come from the 
dominant, affluent Western culture (the North), while many interventions 
occur in non-Western environments (the South). As a result, interveners 
must be extremely careful about transporting their own cultural models of 
conflict intervention to other places and other peoples.  
 
Kevin Avruch and Peter Black (1993) have proposed that the 
first step in a successful intervention should be to carry out a cultural 
analysis of the conflict, one which goes beyond one’s own cultural 
identity, seeking instead to ascertain the particular cultural dimensions of 
the conflict and to assess their relevance to its expression and potential 
resolution. Adding cultural analysis to the usual historical, political, 
strategic and social analyses that third parties traditionally carry out 
promises to provide a richer, firmer and more respectful base from which 
to work. 
 
 
IV.2 Power Asymmetries 
 
In all third-party interventions, sensitivity to power dynamics is 
critical to understanding and effectiveness. The question is how power 
imbalances between the parties, and between the third-party and one or 
more of the parties affect both process and outcomes.  
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Usually some degree of power balance is necessary before 
third-party interventions can operate effectively (Fisher 1972). Each party 
must be in a position to seriously confront the other, either in the present 
or in the future, so that constructive interaction can ensue. Sadly, 
however, dominant groups or individuals are not noted for their capacity 
to cede power without challenge; they are better known for abusing 
power in the absence of institutional controls.  
 
Outside parties often play a useful role in advocating for weaker 
parties, and third parties also serve a preventive function by facilitating 
dialogue, and building understanding, trust and respect, so that conflict 
expression at the point of confrontation takes less violent forms. Without 
some degree of power parity, however, the intervention process can 
easily become a sham, in which the stronger party influences the 
interaction for its own benefit, while the fundamental issues remain 
unaddressed. Within some range, third parties can work to balance 
situational power, and indeed will often support weaker parties through 
activities like training and advice, thus enabling them to be more effective 
players. In short, however, even in facilitative processes, as pointed out 
by Nadim Rouhana and Susan Korper (1997), interveners need to be 
cognizant of how power asymmetries can affect the goals of the 
intervention and the level of conflict analysis on which action implications 
are based. 
 
A question arises in this context about the coercive use of 
rewards and punishments, as used for example in power mediation. In 
some cases of protracted and escalated conflict, power mediation may 
well have a useful role to play in bringing about an initial settlement in 
the face of continuing hostility. It remains true, however, that the use of 
coercive power fundamentally contradicts the values of autonomy and 
free choice which should govern the field of conflict resolution Thus, 
powerful individuals or institutions with access to resources of value to 
the conflicting parties must be sensitive to their pervasive effects. When 
combined with a lack of cultural sensitivity, the higher power of the 
intervener can easily lead to the importation of dominant methods or 
directed solutions. As Vivienne Jabri (1995) maintains, third parties of 
either a directive or facilitative bent should strive to understand their 
interventions as actions situated within the structures of existing social 
systems, with the potential to contribute either to their maintenance or to 
their transformation. 
 
 
IV.3. Third-Party Bias 
 
The received view on third-party bias is that the third-party 
should be impartial, without favoring one party over the other, neutral, 
and not determining outcomes one way or the other. Impartiality is seen 
as one of the main requirements of acceptability by the parties, and as a 
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prerequisite to establishing a relationship of trust. It serves as the basis 
for effectively carrying out the role of intervener.  
 
More recently, the question has been raised whether mediators 
who are biased towards one party or the other can also play a useful role 
in conflict management. Saadia Touval and William Zartman (1989) argue, 
for example, that the motives of the mediator are best described in the 
context of power politics, and that mediators almost always have their 
own interests, so that they are very seldom truly indifferent to the issues 
and terms being negotiated.  
 
From the parties’ perspective, impartiality of the mediator may 
be less important than the achievement of a favorable outcome and the 
importance of a continuing relationship with a powerful mediator. The 
more distant party may accept a biased mediator precisely because they 
believe the third-party will have greater influence over the preferred party 
in terms of moving them toward settlement. This analysis has been 
developed primarily at the international level, and its utility at other 
levels of intervention remains to be seen. However, these considerations 
do lend a more complex and strategic cast to the question of mediator 
impartiality. If biased mediators with political agendas and tangible 
interests in the dispute can be effective, the range of mediation 
possibilities is broadened. However, this approach compromises the 
voluntary, non-coercive nature of mediation, which is compatible with the 
value base of the conflict resolution field. 
 
 
IV.4 Timing and Ripeness in Mediation 
 
In terms of timing, it appears that intervention in bilateral or 
multilateral disputes is likely to occur only after some period of 
development and escalation has elapsed. Sadly, mediation efforts are 
typically initiated only after the parties’ attempts have failed and coercion 
or violence has already taken place, thus presenting the mediator with a 
situation in which significant costs have been incurred, and positions and 
attitudes have become hardened. 
 
When might the most propitious moment(s) of intervention be? 
Consideration of this has led to the concept of “ripeness”, which refers 
both to a condition of the conflict and to the right time for intervention. 
William Zartman (1985) has posited the concepts of a “ripe moment” and 
a “hurting stalemate”, referring primarily to international conflict. From a 
realist perspective, Zartman argued that parties are likely to consider 
outside intervention only after they have exhausted themselves to the 
point of a costly deadlock from which they see no exit. In addition, if the 
parties perceive that their situation will only get worse, especially if they 
experience a recently avoided or an impending catastrophe, then they will 
be receptive to intervention. A mutual sense of futility in dealing with the 
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conflict must be combined with a belief that a conciliatory move will be 
reciprocated by the other party. The parties must come to believe that 
mediation can bring about a way out of the conflict through a negotiated 
solution. 
 
Zartman’s analysis is a sobering one in that it makes clear the 
high costs of destructive conflict, and is supported by some evidence that 
international mediation is likely to be more effective at later rather than 
earlier stages of conflict escalation. At the same time, there also seems to 
be a point of hostility after which conflicts persist to the point of 
intractability. Therefore, it may well prove counterproductive (as well as 
morally unacceptable) to wait for a “hurting stalemate” and catastrophe. 
Indeed, the late Jeffrey Rubin (1991) has maintained that there are many 
“ripe moments” for intervention in destructive conflicts. Rather than 
viewing timing as a trap, and waiting for hurting stalemates and 
impending catastrophes, third parties should rather look for ways to 
create ripeness, regardless of the stage of the conflict. This position is 
compatible with interactive conflict resolution and the contingency 
model, both of which maintain that any form of facilitated intervention is 
almost always more useful than inactivity 
 
 
IV.5 Effectiveness of Third Party Intervention 
 
Although third parties can play useful roles in a wide range of 
conflicts at various levels of human society, it is clear that they are not 
always successful in doing so. While the question of effectiveness is 
complex, attempts to evaluate third-party activities have been made in 
most sectors and with most forms of intervention. These evaluations use 
a variety of indicators, from settlement rates, to satisfaction of the 
parties, to attitudinal and relationship changes, to perceived fairness of 
the solution, and to compliance with the agreement (see for example, 
Kressel and Pruitt, 1989; Kressel, 2000). 
 
Such evaluations of effectiveness must first consider the 
differing objectives of the various forms of intervention. For example, 
third-party consultation is not designed to produce agreements on 
substantive issues, whereas mediation is, and should rightly be assessed 
on that basis. In contrast, most forms of mediation are not designed to 
transform the relationship between the parties, whereas consultation is 
directed to attitude change and relationship improvement that will 
support cooperative interaction and conflict transformation. Thus, it is 
essential to identify the dependent variables that are the expected 
outcomes of a specific form of intervention, and to tailor the evaluation of 
effectiveness to these. One should not criticize mediation because the 
underlying attitudes of the parties remain unchanged, or consultation 
because it does not lead directly to the settlement of the dispute. 
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Most forms of mediation in domestic settings, at least in North 
America, enjoy reasonable rates of success, usually above fifty per cent in 
terms of settlement rates. Overall satisfaction with mediation and 
compliance with agreements are also moderately high in absolute terms, 
as well as in comparison to traditional methods of management. The 
overall sense is that mediation works, and that it is usually well-received 
and cost-effective in comparison with authoritative and adversarial 
alternatives, such as litigation in the court system.  
 
At the international level, however, studies of mediation 
effectiveness in achieving settlements show far more mixed results, with 
settlement rates varying from around ten to approximately fifty percent, 
depending on the measure of success used and the cases of intervention 
studied. Sadly, mediation success in protracted civil wars of an 
ethnopolitical nature is especially low, in the order of ten to twenty 
percent. Here, there appears to be a level of intractability associated with 
identity conflicts that have escalated to widespread violence, which is 
particularly resistant to intervention efforts. 
 
The practice of third-party consultation is much less developed 
and less frequently employed than is mediation in intercommunal or 
international disputes. Nonetheless, my recent review of three decades of 
unofficial third-party interventions yielded generally positive results, at 
least according to the case analyses of the interveners (Fisher 1997). An 
assessment of the outcomes of a variety of problem-solving workshops 
and similar interventions shows evidence that the vast majority do indeed 
make a positive contribution to conflict resolution. Specifically, fifty-eight 
percent were seen as having a positive influence on or making a tangible 
contribution to the wider peace process, while twenty-six percent made 
tangible contributions to negotiations in terms of analyses, formulations, 
or frameworks. These initial results support the expanded use of 
interactive conflict resolution both in its own right and as a 
complementary activity to official peacemaking. 
 
 
IV.6 The Ethics of Intervention 
 
The question of the ethics of intervention at both the individual 
and institutional levels is both a political and a practical matter. At its 
root, it involves the way in which moral and ethical principles are 
translated into guidelines for practice and from there into assurances to 
be provided to those affected by one's work. Ethics is not simply a matter 
of do’s and don’ts; it is impossible to formulate simple prescriptions 
which will govern all situations. Rather, it is best understood as an 
ingrained part of the identity of individuals and organizations. Those who 
presume to intervene in the lives of others, especially in critical situations 
of conflict, need to consider very consciously the moral and ethical 
consequences of their actions. As with the law, ignorance is no excuse. 
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It is essential that conflict intervention, especially at the level of 
collectivities, be seen as a form of professional practice, with the usual 
requirements placed upon those who set out to practice the profession 
(Fisher 1997). These include sufficient knowledge to allow for an 
understanding of the phenomena encountered (destructive social 
conflict) as well as of the practice undertaken (mediation, consultation, 
etc.), a genuine dedication to human welfare, a commitment to 
continuously improve understanding and competence, and a sense of 
integrity and standards for ethical conduct which will govern interactions 
with those who are served. Conflict interveners who operate in an 
informal and unofficial manner, be it at the grassroots level or at the 
highest political level, must feel impelled to take these considerations as 
seriously as does the international diplomat who mediates interstate 
disputes. 
 
Most individuals working in conflict resolution as it is currently 
constituted in Western culture come from a professional base that is 
sensitive to ethical considerations, for example, law, social work, and 
psychology. Informal third parties in communal settings are also usually 
aware of the ethical principles that necessarily accompany their role, 
even if these are not systematically codified. Integrity does not require a 
professional stamp for its validity, and neither does ethical conduct 
require a formalized code. However, all who would intervene in the affairs 
of others should be prepared to reveal the base of their competence and 
should at all times operate with high regard for the welfare of their 
clients.  
 
Authoritative third-party roles have often provided a base for 
unethical conduct that was in the service of the intervening institution 
rather than the individuals or groups receiving the intervention. It must 
be realized that parties in conflict are all too often in a vulnerable state 
when seeking outside assistance, and the classic dictum of “Let the buyer 
beware” is not an adequate assurance. The minimal ethical principle of 
“Do no harm” is also unfortunately an insufficient ethical foundation for 
practice in conflict intervention. 
  
In terms of ethical functioning from a Western, professional 
base, there are many sources to which conflict resolutionaries can turn 
for guidance. Almost all service professions, including that of 
consultation, have developed ethical codes to guide the practice of their 
members. While these are usually grounded on firm general principles of 
ethical conduct (e.g., honesty, fairness and respect in dealing with 
others), their application is usually geared to the specific situation, in 
which the application of general principles is tailored to the unique 
elements of a given ethical dilemma.  
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Recently, the field of conflict resolution has shown interest in 
developing codes to cover its unique practice. For example, the U.S.-
based Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution has issued a 
statement of ethical standards that is relevant to neutral parties 
intervening in disputes. Some international non-governmental 
organizations involved in conflict transformation work have developed 
principles and/or codes of conduct to govern their interventions in 
situations of conflict, which typically take place in the context of other 
societies and cultures. International Alert, for example, has developed an 
extensive code of conduct that provides a set of basic ethical principles 
supplemented by guidelines specifically concerned with human rights, 
impartiality, and working in partnership with others. 
 
These welcome developments have stirred a valuable debate 
within the field as to the true nature of conflict resolution work, 
particularly as practiced from a dominant Western and Northern base. 
Many issues are relevant, especially revolving around the question of 
whose interests are being served by intervention, the need for cultural 
and gender sensitivity, standards of competency for the practice, as well 
as the needed expansion of culturally aware codes of conduct. These 
useful discussions, which have involved both interveners and recipients, 
can help the field of conflict resolution advance toward serving the needs 
of those whose lives have been ravaged by the scourge of destructive 
conflict. After all, conflict resolution in the short- and longer-term is about 
the work of conflict transformation, not only conflict management. All 
societies can benefit from theory and practice that enables groups who 
are different to live in peaceful partnerships characterized by harmony 
and equality. 
 
 
 
 
 
Methods of third-party intervention have found strong 
expression in the field of conflict resolution, and yet there remains 
significant potential for improvement in both theory and practice. It is 
essential to better understand the different forms of intervention and 
their unique strengths in addressing destructive conflict, especially at the 
intergroup level. Only then will it be possible to make the application of 
particular interventions contingent upon certain characteristics of the 
conflict in question, with the possibility of increasing effectiveness by 
sequencing and combining interventions in a complementary fashion.  
 
In doing so, it is necessary to evaluate the different methods in 
terms of whether each one is geared primarily to peacebuilding and 
conflict transformation or to peacemaking and conflict management. 
While it is indeed valuable to develop generic theory to support of 
practice, it must also be realized that each domain of application (e.g., 
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labor-management, commercial, international, victim-offender) will 
require its own theoretical base for understanding and practice. The 
bottom line must always be that effective third-party intervention seeks 
to be an important ingredient of social change aimed at achieving greater 
harmony and equity between individuals and groups, both within and 
between societies. 
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